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Sridhar Narayanan, Ramarao Desiraju, & Pradeep K. Chintagunta

Return on Investment Implications
for Pharmaceutical Promotional
Expenditures: The Role of
Marketing-Mix Interactions
The authors empirically explore the revenue impact of marketing-mix variables and their interactions. The findings
include the following: pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising and detailing (sales force) affect demand
synergistically, detailing raises price elasticity, and detailing has a higher return on investment than does direct-toconsumer advertising. The authors also discuss other implications and provide future research directions.

n recent years, there has been explosive growth in directto-consumer advertising (DTC) by pharmaceutical manufacturers. Pharmaceutical DTC expenditures varied
from slightly less than $1 billion in 1996 to $2.5 billion in
2000. Compare that with expenditures on detailing (i.e.,
sales representatives “detail” physicians in their offices),
which have increased from $8 billion in 1995 to only
approximately $9 billion in 2000. Industry sources predict
that by 2005, DTC spending will reach $7 billion. It is
widely recognized that such growth was partially fueled by
a change in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) policy toward DTC.1
However, no matter how many patients DTC may
induce to walk into a physician’s office, if a physician says
no to a request for a specific medicine, significant advertising dollars have been potentially wasted. Given this, drug

I

1From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry
communicated with consumers mainly through nonbranded public
service announcements. During that period, the FDA required that
DTC advertising mention a specific indication for a brand name
drug and include a brief summary of side effects and adverse reactions from the FDA-approved label. In 1997, the FDA relaxed
restrictions on the content of DTC, essentially making the advertisements considerably less expensive to broadcast.
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manufacturers are struggling to measure the cost effectiveness of their multimillion-dollar DTC campaigns. For
example, according to Lee Weinblatt, chief executive officer
of PreTesting, an advertising consultancy company in
Tenafly, N.J., “Over 80% of our clients are questioning the
efficiency of their consumer advertising” (PreTesting.com
2004).
Identifying marketing investments that generate a
proven return on investment (ROI) is now a main concern
for companies because such investments take funding priority over ones made on faith (see, e.g., Lehmann 2002).
Moreover, firms are being urged to understand any synergy
among the various elements of the marketing mix, such as
detailing and DTC, in order to leverage the impact of such
interactions. As Gatignon and Hanssens (1987, p. 257)
point out, the optimal resource allocations that arise from
models that account for marketing-mix interactions can be
significantly different from those inferred from, for example, constant elasticity models.
Intuitively, if there were a positive, synergistic effect
between DTC and detailing, it would be valuable to employ
both simultaneously. However, if there were negative interactions, it might benefit firms to limit the overlap among the
mix elements and perhaps devote more resources to the one
that has a better return on the dollar. The arguments for
examining interaction effects between detailing and DTC
also hold for interaction effects between other promotional
activities and between price and any other element of the
marketing mix.2 For example, with respect to the latter, if
greater advertising reduces (raises) price sensitivity, it
enables firms to raise (lower) prices.
However, although academics have had a long-standing
interest in understanding the effectiveness of marketing
activities, limited attention has been devoted to the study of
interactions among the elements of the marketing mix. For
example, researchers have investigated the role of price ×
advertising interactions (for an overview, see Kaul and Wit2These include interactions between meetings or events and
detailing and meetings or events and DTC.
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tink 1996), but little is known about the interactions among
the various marketing-mix elements that are at the disposal
of companies (e.g., in the pharmaceutical industry, these
include price; detailing; DTC; and other marketing efforts
[OMEs] such as journal advertising, meetings, and events).
Our search of the literature, which spans a few decades,
identified only eight studies that examine marketing-mix
interactions at the aggregate level (see Table 1).
Similarly, after reviewing 320 empirical studies on the
determinants of (firms’) financial performance, Capon, Farley, and Hoenig (1990, pp. 1144, 1159) make the following
observations: “Only a handful of studies made an explicit
attempt to model interactions among the causal factors,”
and “There may be synergies (positive and negative) leading to various optimal combinations.... [W]ork on interaction of causal factors is badly needed if the analysis is to
move towards optimal allocation of resources among controllable variables.”
Analogous sentiments are shared by other researchers in
related contexts; for example, Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox
(1995, p. G125) note: “Few empirical results have been
generated regarding the synergies between feature advertising, displays, and price discounts” (for a recent review of
that literature, see Lemon and Nowlis 2002). In summary,
an understanding of whether marketing-mix elements such
as DTC and detailing have a positive or negative synergistic
effect appears to be important and warrants research
attention.
To that effect, our empirical analysis focuses on two
questions: First, are there any significant interaction effects
between pairs of marketing-mix elements? For example, is
the impact of detailing enhanced by DTC? Second, if there
are interaction effects, what is their likely impact on
revenues?
The latter question is relevant because previous academic research has largely been concerned with measurement
(e.g., estimated demand elasticity, lagged effects of advertising), and the link to revenues (or other measures of financial performance) has rarely been made (see, e.g., Leeflang
et al. 2000; Little 1979). There are two exceptions, both
sponsored by the Association of Medical Publications: the
work of Neslin (2001) and Wittink (2002). The main goal of
these studies is to explore the “average” or “median” impact
(across categories) of medical journal advertising along

with DTC, detailing, and other promotional expenditures.
Given the relatively large amount of data (e.g., Neslin analyzes monthly data from 391 brands), it is quite challenging
to characterize the interaction effects among promotional
expenditures in these studies (see, e.g., Wittink 2002). A
common observation across the two studies is that the ROI
for DTCs is quite low.
In a complementary way, our empirical analysis examines the second-generation antihistamine category of drugs.
In addition, to assess the extent of our results’ category
specificity, we analyze antiviral drugs that treat genital herpes. These two categories span the range from extensive use
of DTC (antihistamines) to more limited use (antivirals),
and they help ensure that the qualitative nature of our
results is not driven entirely by the fact that antihistamines
constitute a category with significant DTC.
Overall, the distinguishing features of our article are the
following: (1) We explore the full range of interactions
between pairs of marketing-mix elements and determine
their differential impact on category sales and brand shares
in two distinct prescription drug categories, (2) we assess
the financial implications of detailing and DTC expenditures by providing ROI measures, and (3) we measure the
impact of the interactions between marketing-mix elements
both on the ROIs for detailing and DTC and on the price
elasticities.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In the
next section, we review the relevant literature. The subsequent four sections discuss our model, the data, estimationrelated issues, and the results, respectively. The penultimate
section summarizes the managerial implications of our
analysis, and the final section concludes with directions for
further research.

Relevant Literature
Two main streams of research are relevant to our analysis:
(1) research on the interaction between marketing-mix
elements and (2) other research that examines pharmaceutical promotional spending. We discuss each of these
subsequently.
The impact of detailing and DTC can be simply additive. Two recent studies (Neslin 2001; Wittink 2002) report
such a possibility. Neslin (2001) uses monthly data from

TABLE 1
Prior Research on Interactions Between Marketing-Mix Elements
Article
Lemon and Nowlis (2002)
Azoulay (2001)
Rizzo (1999)
Mela, Gupta, and Lehmann (1997)
Gatignon and Hanssens (1987)
Parsons and Vanden Abeele (1981)
Swinyard and Ray (1977)
Kuehn (1962)

Interactions Examined

Effect

Feature advertising × price cut
Display × price cut
Advertising × sales force
Advertising × price
Advertising × nonprice promotions
Advertising × sales force
Sales force × samples
Advertising × sales force
Advertising × product quality

Depends on price tier
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive

Notes: The research listed here does not focus on interactions that involve price. For research that focuses on price × advertising interactions,
see Kaul and Wittink (1996).
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391 branded products from various pharmaceutical categories and, for a “median” brand, estimates the impact of
detailing and DTC on the number of prescriptions written
by physicians.3 He finds that the ROI for $1 of detailing is
$1.72, and the corresponding ROI for DTC is $.19.4 Wittink
(2002) expands on this analysis by considering more data
points and by distinguishing between the size of the brands
and their launch date in characterizing the average response
to promotional investments. Wittink also finds considerable
difference between the ROIs of detailing and DTC; for
example, for brands that have at least $500 million in
annual revenues and that launched between 1998 and 2000,
ROI for detailing is $11.60 and $1.30 for DTC.5
Benchmark estimates, such as the preceding ones,
obtained from pooling the data across a variety of pharmaceuticals are valuable to the understanding of the impact of
promotional expenditures on market response. It is important to extend such research by exploring whether the
results, articulated in terms of a median (or average) drug,
apply to specific product-markets. Our study provides such
an exploration.
In contrast to the additive effects we have outlined,
other extant research finds evidence for synergies between
marketing-mix elements (for a list of such studies, see Table
1). For example, Swinyard and Ray (1977) find that advertising’s effectiveness is enhanced when it follows a personal
selling encounter. However, there is also evidence in the literature of a negative interaction between detailing and DTC
(e.g., Azoulay 2001); this effect is referred to as “jamming.”
The premise of the argument is that detailing typically is a
scientific source of information for physicians and that
DTC swamps the positive effect, perhaps when physicians
generate counterarguments to the claims in the
advertisements.
Overall, the conclusions in extant research appear to be
that the net interaction effect between detailing and DTC
can be positive, nonexistent, or negative. Kaul and Wittink
(1996) report evidence for both positive and negative interactions between price and advertising. As we have noted,
the interactions also have important managerial implications. In this article, we explore the full range of possible
interactions between pairs of the various marketing-mix
elements.
Several researchers have estimated demand functions of
oligopolistic branded products in various pharmaceutical
subcategories (e.g., Berndt et al. 1997; Chintagunta and
Desiraju 2004; Rizzo 1999). Although the demand model
herein is similar to that in the work of Chintagunta and
Desiraju (2004), our study differs in three important ways:
First, we allow for a comprehensive set of interaction
3The study examines two other promotional variables: (1) professional and medical journal advertising and (2) physician meetings and events.
4The study also finds that the ROI for journal advertising is
$5.00, the highest among all promotional variables.
5Wittink (2002) also considers three therapeutic categories
(hypertension, asthma, and arthritis) and examines the impact of
promotions without distinguishing between brand-size and launch
date. The results for these categories are similar to those that he
finds for the difference between the ROIs of detailing and DTC.
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effects among the various marketing-mix elements. In contrast, Chintagunta and Desiraju focus on the strategic interactions among multimarket competitors in several countries. Second, the antidepressant category that Chintagunta
and Desiraju examine does not have significant DTC expenditures for the data duration of their study. In contrast, we
investigate two different product categories (antihistamines
and antivirals) that have various degrees of DTC investment. Consequently, we account for the effects of DTC.
Third, we explicitly include carryover effects of marketing
activities in the analysis.
Two other related studies are also worth noting: those of
Rosenthal and colleagues (2002) and Wosinska (2002).
Both studies consider DTC’s impact on demand. Rosenthal
and colleagues find that 9% to 22% of category growth can
be attributed to DTC. However, the focus of their study is
not on profitability implications; furthermore, because of
data limitations, they treat promotional spending as a simple flow and do not consider carryover effects. Wosinska
uses a large panel of insurance prescription claims (Blue
Shield of California) for cholesterol-lowering drugs and
empirically makes two observations: First, DTC affects
only the market shares of drugs on the formulary (i.e., the
approved drug list); even for such drugs, the marginal
impact of DTC on demand is lower than the marginal
impact of detailing. Second, as we do, Wosinska finds that
the impact of DTC is lower than that of detailing. In addition, we estimate the interaction between DTC and detailing
and the profitability implications. We now discuss the various elements of our model.

Model
In discussing the model, we refer to the antihistamines
product category for expositional convenience. We decompose the sales of each of the focal brands in a given period
as the product of the category sales and the share of that
brand. Category sales denote the number of prescriptions of
all antihistamines (for both the focal brands and other antihistamines) in that period. Category sales are a function of
category-level marketing activities and variables that
account for product diffusion over time. The conditional
share equation reflects the share of each of the three focal
brands and a fourth “brand” that represents all the other
antihistamines available in the market. We use a linear sales
model for category sales and a discrete choice model for
brand share. This hybrid model is appropriate for various
reasons, which we discuss subsequently.
First, the category-level sales specification enables us to
model category-level diffusion and the marketing activities’
role in the process. It has been suggested in prior research
(Wosinska 2002) that marketing activities such as detailing
and DTC play a different role in category sales and brand
switching. A goal of our study is to investigate the differential effects; in particular, we aim to explore the hypotheses
that DTC is the primary marketing activity that drives category expansion and that detailing is the primary marketing
activity that drives brand switching.
Second, a discrete choice model is particularly appropriate for modeling brand shares in our problem because

physicians make a discrete choice from the available drugs.
Our discussions with industry experts revealed that there
are virtually no cases of multiple brands of antihistamines
being prescribed simultaneously because they are considered substitutes. Furthermore, the models are parsimonious.
This is important because we are interested in modeling
interaction effects. If we were to introduce all possible
interactions between different marketing variables and for
different brands, the dimensionality of the problem would
make alternative models, such as linear sales models,
extremely difficult to estimate with the available data.
In addition, we need to accommodate time-varying
choice-sets. Initially, there was only one drug in the category: Claritin. Subsequently, Zyrtec and Allegra were introduced. The mixed-logit discrete choice specification that we
use can easily account for such changes in the choice set.
Most alternative models cannot account for this without
having regime-specific effects (e.g., when there is one
brand or two brands) in addition to all the other estimated
parameters.
The preceding are our various reasons for employing a
hybrid model to explore the issues at hand. We subsequently describe the category sales and conditional share
models.

Let Qjt denote brand j’s sales in month t, where j = 1, 2, ...,
K + 1, the first K brands are the focal brands of interest, and
the K + 1 brand is the “all-other” brand. We determine category sales by aggregating the sales of all brands. The relationships between brand sales, category sales (CQt), and
share (Sjt) are given by the following:
K +1

CQ t =

∑Q

jt ,

and

j=1

K +1

(2)

S jt = Q jt /

∑Q

kt .

k =1

The category sales level depends on the prices, detailing, DTC, and OMEs of all brands in the category. In addition, it depends on factors such as seasonality (SD1 and
SD2).6 To capture possible diffusion effects due to the introduction of new brands and category growth, we include linear and quadratic time trends (t and t2). The category sales
regression model is given as follows:
(3)

(4)

D jt = θD D j, t

−1

+

d jt ,

(5)

A jt = θA A j, t

−1

+

a jt ,

−1

+

and
OME jt = θome OME j, t

(6)

Category Sales Model

(1)

and COMEt, respectively. The Verispan data we use in the
empirical analysis reports a category price for each period,
which is the share-weighted price of the individual brands.
We denote this price as CPt. The interaction terms between
detailing and price, DTC, and OMEs are denoted by CDPt,
CDAt, and CDOMt, respectively. Similarly, CAPt and
CAOMt represent interaction terms between DTC and price
and OMEs, respectively, and COMPt represents the interaction term between OMEs and price. Thus, we account for
all possible paired interaction effects.7 Finally, in Equation
3, et is the random error term and ρ0 − ρ10, κ, τ1, and τ2 are
parameters to be estimated.8
We employ the standard Nerlove–Arrow (1962) exponential decay goodwill model (see also Lilien, Kotler, and
Moorthy 1992, p. 280) for each brand. Let djt, ajt, and omejt
represent brand j’s level of detailing, DTC, and OMEs,
respectively, in period t. Thus, the jth focal brand’s goodwill
stocks in period t (Djt, Ajt, and OMEjt) are

n(CQ t ) = ρ0 + ρ1CD t + ρ2 CA t + ρ3CPt + ρ4 COME t
+ ρ5CDPt + ρ6 CDA t + ρ7 CDOM t + ρ8 CAPt
+ ρ9 CAOM t + ρ10 COMPt + κ1SD1 + κ 2SD 2
+ τ1t + τ 2 t 2 + e t .

The category stocks of goodwill associated with detailing,
DTC, and OMEs (e.g., meetings) are denoted by CDt, CAt,
6Note that we use SD = 1 for March–June (the spring allergy
1
season) and SD2 = 1 for September–October (the fall allergy
season).

ome jt ,

where θD, θA, and θome are the carryover coefficients for
detailing, DTC, and OMEs, respectively, and the square
root captures diminishing effects (Erickson 1992). We constructed the category stock variables for detailing, DTC,
and OMEs exactly as we did for category detailing, DTC,
and OME variables, respectively. Note that we could also
have captured diminishing effects with quadratic terms or
logarithms. A quadratic specification would involve estimation of a large number of additional parameters, particularly
because of the interaction terms. A logarithmic specification
is unable to deal with zeros in the variables. However, the
square root specification avoids such problems and is
appropriate for our analysis.
Conditional Share Model
We employ a mixed-logit formulation (see, e.g., Chintagunta and Desiraju 2004; McFadden and Train 2000) to
specify the focal brand j’s share in period t, denoted by Sjt:
(7)

S jt =

∫ [exp(v

jt

+ ε jt ) exp(v(K

+ 1) t

+ ψ 1t + ψ 2 t 2

Z

K

+ λ1SD1 + λ 2 SD 2 + ε( k

+ 1) t ) +

∑ exxp(v

kt

+ ε kt )]

k =1

f (a)da,

and for the all-other brand, denoted by SK + 1,t:
7We do not explore higher-order interactions because the data
are insufficient to obtain precise estimates for such effects.
8Note that category prices, detailing, and DTC are likely to be
endogenous (i.e., correlated with the error term). We address this
issue by using instruments for these variables.
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(8)

SK + 1, t =

∫ [exp(v

(K + 1) t

+ ψ1t + ψ 2 t 2 + λ1SD1 + λ 2SD 2

Z

+ ε( k + 1) t ) exp(v(K + 1) t + ψ1t + ψ 2 t 2 + λ1SD1
K

+ λ 2SD 2 + ε( k + 1) t ) +

∑ exp(v

kt

+ ε kt )]f (a)da,,

k =1

ing for more flexible substitution patterns, because it preserves the basic logit structure, it can be interpreted as the
aggregation of choice probabilities of heterogeneous utilitymaximizing agents.12 Note that we could have specified a
mixing distribution on the other parameters as well (e.g.,
price sensitivity, detailing sensitivity). However, because of
data limitations, we restrict ourselves to specifying this distribution only for the brand intercepts.

where
(9)

v jt = α j + γ D jt + δ A jt + ω OME jt + β Pjt + µ1D jt Pjt
+ µ 2 D jt A jt + µ 3D jt OME jt + µ 4 A jt Pjt + µ 5A jt OME jt
+ µ 6OME jt Pjt ,

where a = {α1 ... αK} is the vector of brand-specific intrinsic preference, and α(K + 1) is normalized to zero; β is the
price sensitivity parameter; Pjt is the price of brand j in
period t; Djt, Ajt, and OMEjt are the stocks of goodwill
defined in Equations 4–6; and γ, δ, and ω represent the corresponding sensitivities, respectively. The parameters µ1−µ6
capture the sensitivities to the interaction terms. We include
both linear and nonlinear trend terms (t and t2)9 as a secondorder approximation to a more general specification for diffusion of the new drugs in the market;10 ψ1 and ψ2 are the
associated coefficients. The seasonal dummy variables are
SD1 and SD2, and λ1 and λ2 are their associated
coefficients.
Our rationale for introducing the term εjt in Equation 7
is as follows: There are several unobserved brand- and timespecific factors—potentially correlated with prices, detailing, and DTC—that could influence a brand’s sales. These
include the influence of organizations such as health maintenance organizations and other factors such as the publication of medical studies and newspaper articles about newly
discovered side effects. All such factors are reflected in εjt,
and we assume that it is a mean zero term.
In Equation 7, we explicitly account for heterogeneity
by assuming that the αj parameters are draws from some
unknown underlying distribution.11 We use a = {αj, j = 1, 2,
..., K} to denote the parameters of the share specification,
f(a) to denote the joint density of the distribution of the
parameters, and Z to denote the region of support of this
mixing distribution that results in the choice of brand j.
This mixed-logit formulation does not suffer from the
restrictive elasticities that are typically associated with the
standard logit model, which is the main reason we use this
specification. In addition to the mixed-logit model’s allow9Note that t denotes the time, in months, since the introduction
of the first of the three brands under consideration and captures the
time trend in the share growth (decay) of the focal brands in the
market compared with that of all-other brands. If we change this to
a variable specific to each drug based on the time of its introduction, only the estimates of the brand-specific intercepts are
affected.
10We also included higher-order terms, but they did not affect
the results significantly.
11The variation in the parameters could be due to various reasons, including cross-sectional heterogeneity, by which the preferences and sensitivities to marketing activities could vary.
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Overview of the Data
In this section, we discuss the data for the first category we
study: second-generation antihistamines. A reason for our
focus on antihistamines is the increasing use of DTC by
leading firms in the category. Furthermore, industry experts
12For a more detailed discussion of how this mixed-logit
approach allows for flexible substitution patterns, see, for example, Nevo (2000) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).

TABLE 2
Number of Prescriptions and Market Shares:
Antihistamines
Variable
Prescriptions (000)
Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec
Total
Shares (%)
Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec
All other

Mean

Standard
Deviation

922.88
1364.97
807.16
5927.65

510.42
652.32
408.39
1913.32

16.23
36.43
13.30
44.12

7.23
14.16
4.98
28.94

TABLE 3
Prices, Detailing, DTC, and OMEs: Antihistamines
Variable
Prices
Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec

Mean
39.19
48.32
40.84

Standard
Deviation
4.32
4.98
.95

Detailing ($ in millions)
Allegra
7.3342
Claritin
6.8024
Zyrtec
6.2402

2.9058
2.4725
2.0198

DTC ($ in millions)
Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec

5.2632
5.5307
4.5424

4.1873
6.4225
4.5543

Meetings ($ in millions)
Allegra
1.2417
Claritin
1.0337
Zyrtec
1.1230

.8213
1.0706
.8789

Notes: Prices and expenditure on detailing, DTC, and meetings are
all expressed in constant January 1993 dollars.
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indicate that in categories in which generics have been
introduced, firms tend to reduce (if not discontinue) detailing activities. Therefore, to better understand the impact of
detailing, it is critical to select a category in which generics
have not yet accrued significant market shares. For these
reasons, we focus on the marketing-mix decisions of three
branded antihistamines: Claritin, Zyrtec, and Allegra.
Our data, obtained from Verispan, comprise observations on three brands of second-generation antihistamines
and the fourth all-other brand, which is the aggregation
across all other antihistamines (first-generation antihistamines and prescribed over-the-counter medications). The
second-generation antihistamines perform much like the
first-generation drugs (e.g., Chlor-Trimeton, Benadryl) but
improve “quality of life” considerably as a result of
improved side-effects profiles (e.g., less drowsiness).
The observations in the data are for the entire U.S. market, on a monthly basis, from April 1993 through March
2002. For each brand, the data set tracks the total prescriptions written, the average retail price of the prescription,
detailing expenditures, DTC expenditures, and OME expenditures. Descriptive statistics for the data appear in Tables 2
and 3, and Figures 1–4 depict the time series of sales,
detailing expenditures, DTC expenditures, and OME expen-

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Month

ditures, respectively. Note that the timing of introduction of
the three brands is as follows: Claritin in April 1993, Zyrtec
in January 1996, and Allegra in August 1996.

Estimation Issues
Methodology
The category demand function in Equation 3 is a simple linear regression. We used the methods laid out in the work of
Berry (1994) and Nevo (2000) to obtain estimates for the
parameters of the brand-share function in Equation 7. We
deflated prices using the consumer price index for all urban
consumers. We deflated detailing expenditures using the
wage series for all workers. We obtained the consumer price
index and wage series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
Our price variable is the average retail price per prescription. We believe that this is a reasonable measure
because, according to industry experts, physicians or
patients often use price per prescription to compare
medications.
Instruments
Our analysis assumes that firms’ prices, detailing, and DTC
activities are endogenous in the category sales and brandPharmaceutical Promotional Expenditures / 95

share models. Thus, we needed to instrument for these variables in the estimation because they could be correlated
with the error terms. We used three sets of instruments in
the estimation. The first set has variables that could potentially drive the costs of producing the drugs and includes the
producer price index (PPI) for pharmaceuticals, obtained
from BLS. This series captures the prices for bulk drugs and
therefore a component of the costs faced by the marketers
of brand name antihistamines. In the estimation, we allowed
the instruments to influence prices of the various brands differentially by interacting them with the brand intercepts in
the estimation. Furthermore, we used lagged values (up to
12 periods) of the PPIs interacted with the brand intercepts
as additional instruments. Thus, we constructed 36 (12 ×
3 = 36) instruments from the PPIs.
For detailing instruments, we compiled the data for the
number of employees from the annual reports of the firms
in our data set. Although firms report financial numbers to
the Securities and Exchange Commission every quarter,
they report the number of employees only annually. We
assumed that the number of employees in any month was
the same as for the year. Thus, we developed one instrument
from the employee data.13 Finally, we used the PPIs for
television, radio, and print advertising (which we obtained
from BLS) as instruments for DTC. We also included interactions of the instruments for price, detailing, and DTC to
construct the overall instrument matrix.14
The Heterogeneity Distribution
We assumed that the set of parameters, a = {αj, j = 1, 2, ...,
K}, is heterogeneous, and we specified a normal distribution to represent this heterogeneity. Because we assumed
that brand preferences are not correlated, we had three
mean parameters and three variance parameters to estimate.
We could have allowed for a richer structure of heterogeneity, including the sensitivities to marketing activities and the
interaction terms and correlations between different parameters; however, data limitations did not enable us to estimate the large number of parameters that such a specification would entail.

13Note that the firms in the data set are Schering-Plough (maker
of Claritin); Aventis (maker of Allegra), which was formed by the
merger of Rhone-Poulenc and Hoechst (thus, for earlier periods,
we used the sum of employees for the two firms); and Pfizer
(maker of Zyrtec), for which we added Warner-Lambert’s figures
before it merged with Pfizer.
14We also conducted two additional sets of analysis. First, we
conducted a robustness check using another set of instruments that
contained promotional expenditures in the nasal steroid category.
There are common underlying factors that drive promotional
spending in both categories. In addition, regulatory factors, seasonality, and other institutional factors are similar between the two
categories. Thus, the nasal steroid promotional activities are likely
to be correlated with those in the antihistamine category but uncorrelated with the error term. Second, we also compared predictions
for a holdout sample with the sets of instruments. The overall
results are consistent; all these analyses are available on request
from the authors.
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Carryover Parameters
The carryover parameters (θD, θA, and θome) could not be
estimated and needed to be fixed. Our preliminary analysis
with simple models that allow for the estimation of these
parameters revealed that carryover parameters were 86%,
75%, and 92% for detailing, DTC, and OMEs, respectively.
For our estimation, we fixed the carryover rates at these values.15 The rates seem to be consistent with other findings in
the literature. For example, Roberts and Samuelson (1988,
Table 2) report advertising retention rates of greater than
80% in the cigarette industry, and Berndt and colleagues
(1997) report a carryover rate of 85% for advertising in the
antiulcer pharmaceutical market.16
Standard Errors
We computed the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors using Newey and West’s (1987)
estimator.

Results and Discussion
This section is divided into several subsections that are
organized as follows: We begin by discussing the parameters of the demand function. We then discuss the single- and
multiperiod ROI measures for DTC and detailing. We next
discuss the impact of marketing-mix interactions on ROI
and consider the impact of the interactions on price elasticity. Finally, we present the results from the antiviral
category.
Parameters of the Demand Function
In Table 4, we provide the parameter estimates and the standard errors from the category sales regression model in
Equation 3. Note that in this model, we explicitly account
for the endogeneity in price, detailing, and DTC stock variables by using PPIs for pharmaceuticals as instruments for
prices; employees in all the three firms in the category as
instruments for detailing; and PPIs for radio, television, and
print advertising as instruments for DTC. We find that after
controlling for the two seasonal effects and the diffusion
effects through the time trend, only DTC has a statistically
significant effect. This finding is consistent with previous

15We found the parameters using a grid search for a simple
aggregate logit model with an outside good to represent category
growth. The aggregate logit model reduces to a linear regression,
and we chose the parameters with the highest R2. Such a gridsearch method is a fairly standard way of estimating the carryover
parameters. For example, Wittink (2002) uses a grid search to find
the carryover parameter; similarly, Guadagni and Little (1983) use
a grid search to find the carryover for the loyalty smoothing parameter. Berndt and colleagues (1997) also use a grid-search
methodology similar to ours, in which we estimate the model for
various values of carryover and choose the set of parameters for
which the sum of squared residuals is the lowest. Note that if we
conducted this grid search for our full model, each iteration of the
mixed-logit model would take several hours.
16For further evidence on retention rates (including on monthly
data), see Clarke’s (1976) survey of results from more than 70
studies that use the distributed lag structure.

TABLE 4
Parameter Estimates of the Category Sales
Model: Antihistamines
Parameters

Estimate

Intercept
Price
Detailing stock
DTC stock
OMEs stock
Detailing × price
Detailing × DTC
Detailing × OMEs
DTC × price
DTC × OMEs
OMEs × price
Time
Time2
Spring season (SD1)
Autumn season (SD2)

8.9681**
–.0063
–.0093
.0152*
.0145
.0210
.0156
–.0035
–.0033
.0006
–.0004
–.0097
4.6976e-05
.1452**
.0859**

Standard
Error
.7245
.0131
.0560
.0084
.0173
.0307
.0194
.0055
.0024
.0005
.0004
.0063
.0001
.0309
.0267

*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.

research (Wosinska 2002). Table 4 also indicates that none
of the marketing-mix interactions are statistically significant. We find that the two seasonal dummy variables have
significant effects, which reflects the strong seasonality in
the category as a whole.
We report the estimates for the parameters of the conditional share model, from Equation 7, in Table 5.17 We find
that Claritin is the most preferred brand, followed by Zyrtec
and Allegra, in that order. The parameter estimates for the
main effects of price, detailing, and DTC are statistically
significant and have the expected signs. Detailing and price
are significant at the 95% level, and DTC is significant at
the 90% level. However, the parameter for the direct effect
of OMEs is insignificant. These results, together with the
ones for the category sales model (Table 4), reveal a notable
contrast. Although detailing has a significant effect on
brand switching but not category sales, DTC has significant
effects both on category sales and on brand switching.
It is worthwhile to compare these findings with ones
from previous empirical research. Rosenthal and colleagues
(2002) find that detailing and DTC affect only category
sales (not brand share); furthermore, DTC has a greater
impact than detailing on category sales. Wosinska (2002)
finds that both DTC and detailing affect brand share, but the
impact of detailing is greater than that of DTC. As does
Wosinska (2002), we find that detailing has a greater effect
on brand switching than DTC.
We find that there are four interaction effects that are
significant at the 95% level: the interactions between (1)
detailing and price, (2) detailing and DTC, (3) detailing and
OMEs, and (4) DTC and OMEs. In addition, the interaction
between OMEs and price is significant at the 90% level.

17Note that we instrumented for all endogenous variables in this
estimation, and the “base brand” is the all-other brand that has
been included in the analysis.

The interactions between detailing and price, between
detailing and OMEs, and between DTC and OMEs are all
negative. The interactions between OMEs and price and
between detailing and DTC are positive.
The positive interaction between detailing and DTC
implies that there is synergy between the two marketing
activities. In other words, a physician sales call (which usually emphasizes the therapeutic benefits of a brand) has a
greater impact when combined with the brand’s television
or print advertisement (which induces consumers to ask
their physician about it). In the context of pharmaceutical
promotional expenditures, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that such a positive synergy has been documented.
In contrast, the finding of significant, negative interactions between OMEs on the one hand and DTC or detailing
on the other hand points to the lack of synergy between
these pairs of activities. Coupled with the finding of no significant main effect for OMEs, it appears that OMEs’ influence on the demand for the three antihistamines is limited.
The set of interactions between price and detailing and
between price and OMEs is also notable. As we noted previously, the detailing × price interaction is negative and significant. Because the main effect of price is negative, a negative interaction implies that greater detailing increases
price sensitivity. In turn, this implies that more detailing
reduces the prices that firms can charge for their drugs. The
OMEs × price interaction is significant at the 90% level but,
in contrast to the detailing × price interaction, is positive.
This implies that greater amounts of OMEs reduce price
sensitivity and therefore enable firms to charge a higher
price for their drugs. The interaction between price and
DTC is not statistically significant.
Next, to understand the joint impact of main and interaction effects of the promotional expenditures, we compute
the short-term promotional elasticities. For example, by
“short-term detailing elasticity,” we refer to the percentage
change in current-period sales (prescriptions written, in our
case) for every percentage change in detailing investments.
These elasticities enable us to compare the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients of detailing and DTC investments
for the three brands. We compute the elasticities by simulating the new sales of each brand by varying the respective
promotional variable by 1%. In principle, when a variable
changes for a particular brand, it also changes for the category as a whole. Therefore, the elasticities incorporate the
effects through the brand-share model and the category
model. Detailing share and DTC elasticities are reported in
Table 6.
Inspection of the elasticities reveals that, overall, detailing has a much greater impact on shares than does DTC.18
Furthermore, Allegra’s detailing has the greatest negative
effect on the shares of the other two brands, and Zyrtec’s

18These results appear to be largely consistent with those
reported by Wosinska (2002), who used individual-level data.
They are also consistent with Wittink’s (2002) analysis of large
brands (i.e., with revenues of more than $500 million) introduced
in 1998–2000 (see “Literature Review” herein). However, Wittink
does not present explicit elasticity estimates.
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TABLE 5
Estimates for the Mean Coefficients: Share Model (Antihistamines)
Mean Parameters
Parameter
Intercept: Allegra
Intercept: Claritin
Intercept: Zyrtec
Price
Detailing stock
DTC stock
OMEs stock
Detailing × price
Detailing × DTC
Detailing × OMEs
DTC × price
DTC × OMEs
OMEs × price
Time
Time2
Spring season (SD1)
Autumn season (SD2)

Heterogeneity Parameters

Estimate

Standard Error

Estimate

Standard Error

–4.0348**
–1.9550**
–3.9195**
–.0977**
.2853**
.1946*
.0521
–.0061**
.0185**
–.0114**
4.4855e-05
–.0373**
.0054*
.0960**
–.0004**
.1007**
.1086*

.3840
.3885
.3922
.0215
.0295
.1117
.0652
.0010
.0051
.0056
.0034
.0097
.0032
.0079
4.4730e-05
.0492
.0605

.1996**
.8174**
.2271**

.0065
.0034
.0056

*Significant at the 90% level.
**Significant at the 95% level.

detailing investments have the least effect. Although the
DTC own-elasticity for Claritin is the lowest of the three
brands, its DTC cross-elasticities are higher than those of
the other brands. Thus, although the own-effect of Claritin’s
DTC is low, it is still able to affect the other brands’ shares
more than they affect its share.
This pattern of elasticities implies that the nature of
competition across brands is highly asymmetrical. For
example, the first entrant (Claritin) is able to affect sales of
the other brands negatively through DTC investments, but it
is not as susceptible to the other brands’ DTC investments.
In the case of detailing investments, Allegra has the greatest
effect on the sales of the other brands, and the effect of
Claritin is smaller but comparable. Coupled with the higher
intrinsic preference for Claritin (Table 5), its high crosselasticities imply that the brand is in a strong position in the
antihistamine marketplace. Allegra’s detailing has a large
impact on other brands, but its DTC has a relatively small
impact. In contrast, the effect of Zyrtec’s detailing and DTC
investments on the sales of the other brands is relatively

small. Nevertheless, that Zyrtec can influence its sales
through promotional investments is good news for the
brand; the high own-elasticities suggest that it is able to
influence its own sales by stealing share from the all-other
group that we included in the analysis.
ROI Measures
We now turn to short-term or single-period ROI, which is
the revenue impact of the marginal dollar spent on a particular promotional activity:
(10)

ROIgjt = p jt

∂Q jt
∂g jt


∂S jt ∂G jt
∂CQ t ∂G jt 
= p jt  CQ t
+ S jt
,
∂G jt ∂g jt
∂G jt ∂g jt 


where g is the promotional activity and G is the goodwill
stock associated with the promotional activity (i.e., d and D
denote detailing, and a and A denote DTC), p is the price, Q

TABLE 6
Current-Period Detailing and DTC Elasticities: Antihistamines
Change in Detailing

Change in Number
of Prescriptions

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec

.1772
–.0455
–.0481

–.0423
.0950
–.0436

–.0311
–.0369
.1440

Change in DTC
Allegra
Claritin
Zyrtec
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.0909
–.0151
–.0205

–.0352
.0543
–.0377

–.0138
–.0107
.0717

is the sales, CQ is the category sales, and S is the share of
the respective brand. We also computed the ROIs by simulation; we varied the respective promotional activity by one
dollar and simulated the new sales. Table 7 presents the
current- and multiperiod ROIs.19 Note that these ROIs are
in terms of revenues that correspond to retail prices. Thus,
actual revenues for the manufacturing firm would be lower
because the revenues would be net of retail and wholesale
margins. This must be kept in mind during discussions of
the ROI numbers.
Table 7 reveals that average current-period detailing
ROIs are $1.28 for Allegra, $1.49 for Claritin, and $1.10 for
Zyrtec. Thus, the marginal $1 spent on detailing returns
more than $1 in revenue. This finding supports an increase
in the level of detailing, except if it induces competitive
reaction that raises rival detailing expenditures and makes
the increased spending not pay out. We find that the ROIs
for DTC are lower than the ROIs for detailing and less than
$1. Specifically, the average current-period ROIs are $.85
for Allegra, $.66 for Claritin, and $.76 for Zyrtec. That
ROIs are less than $1 suggests that firms would be better off
reducing their expenditure on this marketing activity. However, as we discuss in the next paragraph, to obtain a more
complete picture of investment returns, both single- and
multiperiod ROIs should be assessed.
Current-period ROIs ignore that effects of marketing
investments last more than one period. Indeed, in our specification, there is carryover of 86%, 75%, and 92% for
detailing, DTC, and OMEs, respectively. When a firm raises
its promotional expenditure by one dollar, that one dollar
affects goodwill not only for the current period but also for
future periods. When this intertemporal linkage is taken into
account, a multiperiod ROI needs to be reported.
We used the following procedure to compute a multiperiod ROI: For a given set of values of all the independent
variables, we computed the expected value of the dependent
variables (shares, category sales, and consequent revenues).
Then, we raised a given promotional expenditure for a single focal period by one dollar and computed the new revenues in the current and subsequent periods (under the
assumption that competitors do not react to such an increase

19We discuss how we computed the multiperiod ROIs later in
this section.

in expenditure). We repeat this experiment for all periods
(except the last 11 periods) and report the multiperiod ROI
as the average change in the sum of revenues for the current
and 11 subsequent periods for every additional one dollar
spent on that promotional activity in the current period.
That is, multiperiod ROI represents the change in revenues
for a year from the period in which the promotional activity
changes. These ROIs are also reported in Table 7 for both
detailing and DTC. We note that long-term ROIs for detailing and DTC are much higher than for single-period ROIs
(Table 7). Thus, detailing continues to have a greater effect
than DTC, even over a longer horizon.
It is worth comparing our findings with those in previous studies that report ROIs for detailing and DTC. Neslin
(2001) reports (multiperiod) ROIs of $1.72 for detailing and
$.19 for DTC. These are considerably lower than the ROIs
in our study. However, when we compare our ROIs with
those reported for large categories (i.e., categories with
median brands that have revenues of more than $200 million per year; under this definition, antihistamines are a
large category), our results are more comparable. Neslin
reports the detailing ROI for large categories launched in
the 1994–1996 period to be $6.76; for large categories
launched after 1996, the detailing ROI was $10.29. These
are comparable to the ROIs in our study (between $7.65 and
$9.19). However, we find that ROIs for DTC are much
higher than even those that Neslin reports for large categories: $1.37 for large categories launched after 1996. This
could reflect the antihistamine category’s status as a poster
child for DTC.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of
our results with those of Wittink (2002). Our detailing ROIs
are consistent with those in Wittink’s study (for the large
brands introduced in 1998–2000), but the ROIs for DTC are
much larger in our case.20 This contrast underscores the
importance of examining different submarkets of the industry and parsimoniously accounting for category-expansion,
share-stealing, and carryover effects to grasp the revenue
impact of promotional investments fully.

20In addition, our long-term ROIs are higher than those reported
in the work of Wittink (2002) for the smaller brands (i.e., less than
$500 million in annual revenues) and for the larger brands that
were launched before 1998.

TABLE 7
ROI Measures: Antihistamines
Additional Revenue ($)
Every Marginal
$1 Spent

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

Detailing
Current period
Multiperiod

1.2814
8.8778

1.4923
9.1920

1.1049
7.6583

DTC
Current period
Multiperiod

.8498
3.8073

.6597
3.6964

.7567
2.7861

Notes: Multiperiod indicates current period + 11 subsequent periods.
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It is useful to note three other studies that examine ROIs
for advertising in nonpharmaceutical categories. Lambin
(1970) studies a mature category of consumer durables in
Europe and finds that ROI for advertising is $1.25 (i.e., the
incremental $1 causes revenues to increase by $1.25).
Horsky (1977) finds that the total incremental gross margins over the course of a year due to an incremental $1
spent on advertising are $1.77 without discounting, $1.60
with discounting, and $1.04 for the current period. Peles
(1971) reports a current-period incremental gross margin of
$.77 and a long-term incremental gross margin of $1.70 for
every incremental $1 spent on advertising. Our results are
similar to the ones in these studies in that an additional $1
spent on advertising raises revenues by more than $1.
Impact of Marketing-Mix Interactions on ROI
Because our focus is interaction effects, we assess the
impact of all the significant interaction effects on ROIs for
detailing and DTC. All interaction effects except that
between price and DTC are significant at least at the 90%
level. We assessed the impact of these interactions on ROIs
by determining the effects of changes in price, OMEs, and
DTC on detailing ROIs and those of detailing and OMEs on
ROIs for DTC. For example, to study the impact of the
interaction effect between detailing and price, we varied
price by 5% to determine the effect that change has, for
example, on detailing ROIs. We implemented the price variation by simulating the category sales and brand shares
using the category and share models at 95% and 105%,

respectively, of the actual price levels. Similarly, we analyzed the effect of DTC on detailing ROIs and price and
detailing on ROIs for DTC. We report these results in
Tables 8 and 9.
An examination of these results reveals that compared
with the other variables, price has a much greater impact on
detailing ROIs. A 5% increase in price decreases detailing
ROIs by 16% to 21% for the three brands. Conversely, a 5%
decrease in price increases detailing ROIs by 15% to 23%.
Detailing and DTC both have a positive effect on each
other’s ROI; that is, increased DTC causes detailing ROI to
increase, and vice versa. Detailing ROI increases by 3% to
4% with a 5% increase in DTC, and it decreases by a similar amount when DTC decreases by 5%. The decrease in
ROI for DTC is between 6% and 16% for a 5% decrease in
detailing, and the ROI for DTC increases by 9% to 12%
with a 5% increase in detailing.
A notable result is that detailing has a greater effect on
ROIs for DTC than vice versa. This is because the interaction effect between detailing and DTC constitutes a greater
component of the total DTC effect than of the total detailing
effect (because the main effect of DTC is much less than the
main effect of detailing). Thus, the interaction effect plays a
bigger role for ROIs for DTC.
In addition, OMEs have a relatively small effect on
detailing ROIs but a much greater effect on ROIs for DTC.
A 5% increase in OMEs causes detailing ROIs to decrease
by 3% to 5%. There is a similar percentage increase in
detailing ROIs if OMEs decrease by 5%. However, ROIs for

TABLE 8
Effect of Price, DTC, and OMEs on Detailing ROI: Antihistamines
Multiperiod Detailing ROI
Levels

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

10.7303
(+20.86%)

10.5548
(+14.83%)

9.4172
(+22.97%)

8.8778

9.1920

7.6583

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

7.0399
(–20.70%)

7.6658
(–16.60%)

6.0492
(–21.01%)

DTC
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

8.5476
(–3.72%)

8.8763
(–3.43%)

7.4055
(–3.30%)

Actual level

8.8778

9.1920

7.6583

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

9.2027
(3.66%)

9.5736
(4.15%)

7.9082
(3.26%)

OMEs
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

9.3413
(5.22%)

9.5761
(4.18%)

7.9043
(3.21%)

8.8778

9.1920

7.6583

8.4306
(–5.04%)

8.9148
(–3.02%)

7.3882
(–3.53%)

Price
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)
Actual level

Actual level
Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

Notes: w.r.t. = with respect to; multiperiod indicates current period + 11 subsequent periods.
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TABLE 9
Effect of Detailing and OMEs on DTC ROI: Antihistamines
Multiperiod DTC ROI
Levels

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

Detailing
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

3.5622
(–6.44%)

3.1028
(–16.06%)

2.4063
(–13.63%)

3.8073

3.6964

2.7861

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

4.3066
(+13.11%)

4.1635
(+12.64%)

3.0309
(+8.79%)

OMEs
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

4.6725
(22.72%)

4.3177
(16.81%)

3.1277
(12.26%)

3.8073

3.6964

2.7861

3.2809
(–13.83%)

2.6784
(–27.54%)

2.1916
(–21.34%)

Actual level

Actual level
Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

Notes: w.r.t. = with respect to; multiperiod indicates current period + 11 subsequent periods.

DTC decrease by 14% to 28% when OMEs increase by 5%.
When OMEs decrease by 5%, ROIs for DTC increase by
12% to 23%. The different magnitudes of effects on ROIs
for detailing and DTC reflect that the interaction effect is a
much greater proportion of ROIs for DTC than for
detailing.
In summary, note that price has a large, negative effect
on detailing ROI, larger than effects due to OMEs. Next,
detailing has a greater effect on ROIs for DTC than vice
versa. Here, we have documented not only the synergy
between detailing and DTC but also the asymmetrical
effects on firms’ revenues. In addition, OMEs have a greater
(negative) impact on ROIs for DTC than for detailing.
It is worthwhile to note that an interaction effect exists
between DTC and detailing on brand sales simply because
DTC has a significant effect on category volume and
because detailing has a significant effect on brand shares.
Thus, even in the absence of any explicit interaction effect
in the brand-share model, we would still observe an implicit
interaction effect. Higher DTC would increase category volumes; thus, detailing ROI would be affected even if the
explicit interaction were to be shut off. To investigate this,

we conducted a simulation in which we set the explicit
interaction terms in the category and brand-share models to
zero and computed the change in detailing ROIs for a 5%
change in DTC. The results are reported in Table 10. Note
that because there is no explicit interaction in the share
model for this simulation, the absolute levels of these ROIs
are different from those reported in Table 7. In particular,
note the percentage changes in ROIs with 5% change in
DTC: We find that a 5% increase in DTC causes detailing
ROIs to increase by approximately .7% to 1.2%. A 5%
decrease in DTC causes detailing ROI to increase by 1% to
3.5%. This is a notable result because it demonstrates a
unique synergistic effect in pharmaceutical categories: DTC
drives category volume by leading patients to talk to their
physicians, and detailing then steals share by inducing
physicians to prescribe the focal drug.
Impact of Marketing-Mix Interactions on Price
Elasticities
We have discussed the implications of the interaction effect
between price and the marketing variables on ROIs. How-

TABLE 10
Effect of DTC on Detailing ROIs: Antihistamines
Own-Price Elasticity
DTC Level

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

3.6943
(–1.00%)

1.2142
(–3.53%)

4.3062
(–1.23%)

Actual level

3.7318

1.2586

4.3600

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

3.7679
(.97%)

1.2672
(.68%)

4.4126
(1.21%)

Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

Notes: Effects pertain to category sales only; that is, the interaction effect in the share model is turned off. w.r.t. = with respect to.
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ever, the two significant interaction effects between price on
the one hand and detailing or OME on the other hand also
have implications for price elasticities. We begin this discussion by recalling the debate in the literature on advertising’s effect on price elasticities (see Kaul and Wittink
[1996], who report empirical evidence for both positive and
negative effects of advertising on price elasticities). We
explore these interactions using an approach similar to the
one used for analyzing the interaction effects on ROIs. We
vary detailing and OMEs for the focal brand by 5% and
record the change in the price elasticities. These results are
reported in Table 11.
We find that greater detailing increases price elasticities.
A 5% increase in detailing increases price elasticities by
1.5% to 2%. A 5% decrease in detailing similarly decreases
price elasticities by approximately 1.5% to 2%. The interaction effect between OMEs and price has the opposite sign
of that between detailing and price. Thus, an increase in
OMEs causes price elasticity to decrease. For example, if
OMEs increase by 5%, price elasticities decrease by
approximately 1.5% to 2.5%. There is a similar increase of
1.5% to 2.5% in price elasticities when OMEs decrease by
5%. These results can have important implications for
firms’ pricing policies (see, e.g., “Managerial Implications”
herein).
Results from the Antivirals Category
The results we have reported are for the antihistamine category. Although there are likely to be differences between
categories in returns on promotional activities, it would be
useful to determine whether our key results on ROI are specific to the category under study or whether the results can
be applied more generally. Of specific concern is that the
antihistamine category has an extremely high level of DTC
among all therapeutic categories. Therefore, we conducted
an identical analysis for the antivirals category in which

DTC expenditures are nonzero but still are much smaller
than those in the antihistamine category.
Although genital herpes is an incurable disease, it can
be controlled and its symptoms mitigated through the use of
specific antiviral drugs. The first drug to be introduced in
this category was Glaxo Wellcome’s Zovirax (generic: acyclovir), which is available both in tablet and topical (cream)
forms (Glaxo Wellcome subsequently merged with SmithKline Beecham to form GlaxoSmithKline). SmithKline
Beecham launched Famvir (generic: famciclovir) in July
1994 but sold it to Novartis in 2000 when Smithkline
merged with Glaxo (to meet Federal Trade Commission
requirements). The merged entity GlaxoSmithKline
launched another drug in the category, Valtrex (generic:
valacyclovir), in September 1995. In April 1997, Zovirax
went off patent, and generic substitutes became available.
The highest-share brand in the category is currently Valtrex. Before its introduction, Zovirax was the market leader.
Valtrex is the only brand that had significant DTC levels,
whereas Famvir and Zovirax had almost none. The expenditure on detailing was relatively steady, and all brands have
invested in detailing.
Our data set for the category consists of a monthly time
series that extends over 11 years of sales, prices, and promotional expenditures for all brands in the category. We set
Zovirax topical as the base brand for the brand-share model
because, unlike the antihistamine category, there is no allother brand in the antiviral case.
We report the detailing elasticities for the antiviral category in Table 12. (Valtex is the only brand in the category
that invested in DTC activity, and its current-period DTC
elasticity is .1777.) All the elasticities have the expected
signs, and their magnitudes are comparable to those for the
antihistamine category. Furthermore, we report the ROIs for
detailing and DTC in Table 13. The current-period detailing
ROI is greater than one for all three brands in the category,

TABLE 11
Effect of Detailing and OMEs on Price Elasticity: Antihistamines
Own-Price Elasticity
Level

Allegra

Claritin

Zyrtec

–3.0081
(–1.58%)

–2.3308
(–1.76%)

–2.9330
(–2.11%)

Actual level

–3.0563

–2.3726

–2.9964

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

–3.1006
(1.45%)

–2.4117
(1.65%)

–3.0565
(2.01%)

OMEs
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

–3.1045
(1.58%)

–2.4117
(1.65%)

–3.0695
(2.44%)

Actual level

–3.0563

–2.3726

–2.9964

Actual + 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

–3.0078
(–1.59%)

–2.3342
(–1.62%)

–2.9249
(–2.38%)

Detailing
Actual – 5%
(% +/– w.r.t. actual level)

Notes: w.r.t. = with respect to.
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TABLE 12
Current-Period Elasticities: Antivirals
Change in Detailing

Change in Number
of Prescriptions

Famvir

Valtrex

Zovirax

Famvir
Valtrex
Zovirax

.5216
–.0885
–.1666

–.1086
.2980
–.1092

–.0371
–.0123
.0735

TABLE 13
ROI Measures: Antivirals
Additional Revenue ($)

For Every Marginal
$1 Spent

Famvir

Valtrex

Zovirax

Detailing
Current period
Multiperiod

2.6786
11.7172

1.6421
8.1088

3.7380
17.6368

DTC
Current period
Multiperiod

.6852
2.8578

Notes: Multiperiod indicates current period + 10 subsequent periods.

which suggests that the marginal dollar spent on detailing
returns more than one dollar in marginal revenues for all
three brands in the category. The ROI for DTC is only
reported for Valtrex, because it is the only brand in the category that invested in DTC. For Valtrex, the ROI for DTC is
less than one, which suggests that the marginal dollar spent
on DTC for the brand returns less than one dollar in marginal revenue in the current period. Although the magnitudes of the ROIs vary from those for antihistamines, the
nature of results we obtained is nevertheless similar to the
nature of results in the antihistamine category.
The multiperiod ROIs for detailing and DTC are also
reported in Table 12. The nature of these multiperiod ROIs
for detailing and for DTC is similar to that for antihistamines. Specifically, we find that the detailing and DTC
ROIs are both greater than one in the long run. Although we
were unable to conduct an analysis of the full set of interactions between pairs of marketing-mix elements, as we did in
the antihistamine category, the interaction effects are consistent with those for that category. For example, detailing
has a similar effect on price elasticity as it does in the case
of antihistamines. A 5% reduction in detailing causes price
elasticities to decrease by 1.34% for Famvir, .91% for Valtrex, and 2.07% for Zovirax. A 5% increase in detailing
similarly causes price elasticities to increase by 1.31%,
.9%, and 2.01%, respectively. Thus, greater detailing leads
to higher elasticities and thus lower prices.

Managerial Implications
This article’s purpose has been to explore the interactions
between pairs of marketing-mix elements and how the
interactions affect ROI. Accordingly, our econometric
analysis identified several statistically significant interactions and estimated the impact of the interactions on ROI.

Although we have reported and discussed our results, here
we reiterate the four results that we deem the central takeaways of the analysis.
First, our analysis finds that the interaction between
price and detailing is negative. Because a higher price
adversely affects demand, the negative interaction implies
that at higher levels of detailing, the demand is even more
sensitive to higher prices. A manager who employs higher
detailing levels faces a downward pressure on prices. We
believe that this finding counters the often-repeated tenet,
“marketing tends to raise prices by (artificially) differentiating the products.” Contrary to such expectations, detailing
efforts seem to reduce differentiation. However, it must be
noted that there are many other factors that drive managers’
pricing decisions, such as firms’ objectives for recovering
research and development costs, health maintenance organizations’ formulary decisions, and other intermediaries’ policies. Thus, pricing policy may not always reflect the interaction effect that we have identified.
Second, a brand’s expenditures on detailing and DTC
can affect sales in two ways: by affecting product category
sales and by affecting the brand’s share of category sales.
Our analysis reveals that whereas DTC has a significant
effect on category sales, detailing does not. In contrast, both
detailing and DTC affect brand shares, and we find that
detailing has a much greater effect than DTC. The implication is that when managers want to drive up category volume, perhaps in the early stages of a product’s life cycle,
they should consider allocating a substantial portion of the
marketing budget to DTC. In contrast, in the more mature
phases of the drug life cycle (but before the entry of generics), it seems beneficial for them to use a mix of detailing
and DTC, with a greater emphasis on detailing.
Third, when making resource allocation decisions, it is
important for managers to consider synergies among the
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various marketing investments. In this context, two of our
findings are particularly relevant: (1) the positive interaction
between DTC and detailing and (2) the negative interaction
between OMEs and either DTC or detailing. Industry
observers often question the value of pharmaceutical manufacturers’ increased DTC spending, particularly when studies such as those of Neslin (2001) and Wittink (2002) show
relatively poor returns on DTC. However, the positive interaction that we identified implies that higher levels of DTC
may indeed make detailing more effective. These two
expenditures work hand-in-hand, and managers can generate an effect that is greater than the sum of its parts by using
these marketing-mix elements simultaneously. Next, the
negative interaction between OMEs and detailing (or DTC)
implies that managers approach OME resource allocation
more carefully. It appears that OME spending jams the
value of the other marketing-mix elements. In this case,
managers are well advised to limit the overlap between
OMEs and either DTC or detailing, perhaps by targeting
different segments (or groups) of physicians with OMEs or
by separating OMEs and DTC (or detailing) temporally.
Fourth, our analysis developed both short- and longterm ROI benchmarks for specific subcategories of pharmaceuticals. Recall that unlike our study, which focuses on one
category of pharmaceuticals at a time, both Neslin (2001)
and Wittink (2002) approach ROI estimates by aggregating
various (categories of) drugs. However, the commonality
among the studies (including ours) is that the ROI for DTC
is less than that for detailing; although the exact numerical
values vary from study to study, the pattern seems to be
fairly robust. We also provide explicit long-term ROI estimates and find that long-term ROIs are approximately four
to seven times single-period ROIs. We note that an increase
in detailing has a greater impact on ROIs for DTC than vice
versa. Finally, although there are individual differences
between the antihistamine and antiviral categories, our
results for both categories suggest that detailing ROIs are
higher than DTC ROIs.
The main implication is that whereas the ROI estimates
developed for a given product-market may or may not apply
to other categories, it is relevant for managers to identify
and understand the underlying drivers of ROI. In this article, we endeavored to highlight the role of interactions in
some detail. Research that explores other drivers of financial performance of marketing variables is certainly
warranted.

Conclusion
We opened this article with the objective of addressing two
issues: (1) the empirical characterization of the interactions

between pairs of marketing-mix elements and (2) the development of benchmarks for the impact of promotional
expenditures (with a particular focus on detailing and DTC
expenditures) on both short- and long-term ROIs.
Using monthly observations from April 1993 to March
2002, we examined market shares, prices, and promotional
expenditures of three brands (Claritin, Zyrtec, and Allegra)
in a subcategory of pharmaceuticals. We focused on this
particular category because of the high expenditures on
DTC and because generic products have not yet appeared in
the market for second-generation antihistamines. To provide
a robustness check, we repeated our analysis on a second
category: antivirals to treat genital herpes.
Our findings reveal that detailing primarily affects the
brand share positively; in contrast, DTC has a significant,
positive effect on both brand share and category sales.
Detailing ROIs are greater than DTC ROIs. Furthermore,
there is a synergy between the effects of the two promotional variables on brand share. We find that changes in
detailing have a greater impact on DTC ROI than vice versa
(i.e., changes in DTC have a smaller impact on detailing
ROI). In addition, we find significant interaction effects
between price and promotional expenditures, and we quantify the impact of these interactions on detailing and DTC
ROIs. Next, long-term ROIs are several times greater than
single-period ROIs; for example, for DTC, they are approximately five times greater.
A feature of DTC is that it is less “targeted” than detailing; that is, whereas the detailing activity ensures that the
target physician is appropriately informed, DTC does not
have the power to ensure a 100% reach to target (potential)
patients. Consequently, it may not be surprising that DTC
ROI is less than that of detailing. However, what is more
surprising is the industry’s increasing expenditures on DTC
despite the relatively poor short-term returns. Our analysis
suggests that a positive interaction between DTC and detailing may be a reason for increased expenditures; however,
other potential reasons for the expenditures are worth
exploring.
Therefore, further research should explore alternative
paths by which DTC affects sales and should consider measuring the impact of different media used in DTC. Further
research will also help characterize the extent of strategic
interactions (i.e., levels of competition and cooperation)
among brands. These issues underscore the importance of
investigating firms’ optimal budget allocation problems.
Overall, our analysis provides a valuable benchmark for
further research, and as our brief discussion suggests, much
work remains to be done in this important area of
marketing.
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